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Abstract
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 demonstrated the need to understand the macro-
dynamics of interconnected financial systems. A fruitful approach to this problem
regards financial infrastructures as weighted directed networks, with banks as nodes
and loans as links. Using a simple banking model in which banks are linked through
interbank lending, with an exogenous shock applied to a single bank, we find a closed-
form analytical solution for the degree at which failures begin to propagate in the
network. This critical degree is expressed as a function of four financial parameters:
banking leverage; interbank exposure; return on the investment opportunity; and in-
terbank lending rate. While the transition to failure propagation is sharpest with
regular networks, we observe it numerically for random and scale-free networks as
well. We find that, if the expected number of failures is not strongly dependent on
the network topology and is well captured by the notion of critical degree, the fre-
quency of catastrophic cascades (with a single shock inducing all or most banks in the
network to fail) tends to be much larger on scale-free networks than on classical ran-
dom networks. We interpret this finding as a manifestation of the “robust-yet-fragile”
property of scale-free networks.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and summary of results
The global turmoil precipitated by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008
demonstrated the need for a solid understanding of the dynamics of interconnected finan-
cial systems and their potential to generate systemic crises (May, 2008; Haldane, 2009;
Helbing, 2013). Before 2000, banking models explored motivations and behaviors of in-
dividual banks (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Santomero, 1984) rather than interbank
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relations (Allen, Babus, and Carletti, 2009). But studying banks in isolation misses the
systemic consequences emerging from non-linear interactions of the banks. And even in
network research, most theoretical and empirical methods are not suited to predicting
failure cascades in economic networks (Schweitzer, 2009).
It has become increasingly evident in the financial sector that shock propagation mech-
anisms are the very core of the systemic risk concept (DeBandt and Hartmann, 2000).
Since the last financial crisis, contagion has come to be seen as perhaps the most impor-
tant type of systemic failure (Allen, Babus, and Carletti, 2009). However, network models
traditionally have not been among the economic models used to understand systemic risk,
even though contagion can be created by complex network exposure (DeBandt and Hart-
man, 2000); only recently have network measures attracted increased attention among
researchers and central banks. Some are looking at network techniques to design better
banking sector regulations, because the network approach allows identification of conflicts
between banks’ individual incentives and systemic implications of actions generated by
those incentives. Network measures explore more specifically how systemic events unfold
(Bisias et al., 2012).
With this work, we try to shed light on the effects of network structure on contagion. We
analyze a directed network of interbank lending, with banks as nodes and interbank loans
as links. We develop a simple model to obtain a closed-form solution for the expression
of the critical degree at which contagion propagates through a network. We also perform
simulations to allow for heterogeneity of network structure. The main finding of this
study is that the critical degree—which depends on the leverage ratio, lending fraction and
interest rate, and can be estimated without detailed knowledge of the network structure—
correctly captures the expected number of failures in general networks. The frequency of
large deviations (such as catastrophic cascades taking out a large fraction of the network),
on the other hand, strongly depends on the network topology
1.2 Literature Review
A new strand of literature is exploring the effects of financial network structures on sys-
temic risk. While some scholars and regulators view interbank lending primarily as an
efficient way to cope with liquidity shocks (Freixas and Santomero, 2003), others recog-
nize that interbank lending potentially provides channels for contagion. Allen and Gale
(2000), using a simple network model of four banks, show that contagion depends on
the structure of banks’ interconnections. When there is aggregate shortage of liquidity,
complete structures are less prone to contagion than incomplete structures, because cross-
holdings better redistribute liquidity. However, Castiglionesi and Navarro (2007), using
the same simple four-bank model, showed that greater connectivity could increase con-
tagion risk because banks may make imprudent investments given the greater insurance
provided by the financial links. Other studies affirm that complete networks are the most
destabilizing because dense linkages facilitate the contagion of shocks (Vivier-Lirimont,
2006; Blume et al., 2011; Battiston et al., 2012; Billio et al. 2012). Ladley (2013) con-
cluded that no inter-bank market structure maximizes stability under all conditions. Using
a two-period model with two symmetric network structures, Acemoglu et al. (2013) find
that when the shock is small enough, a complete network structure is more stable than
an incomplete one. But when a shock is large, completeness does not guarantee stability
and phase transition may occur.
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A common network topology in banking is the one with a small number of highly
connected financial hubs which seems to create a “robust-yet-fragile” structure, suscepti-
ble to rapid transmission of shocks (Haldane and May, 2011): robust because they may
withstand many external shocks; fragile because they may suddenly exhibit a cascade of
failures. This robust-yet-fragile property is seen in many other complex (scale-free) net-
works (Watts, 2002). Similarly, in finance, interbank networks act as mutual insurance
but, beyond a certain range of connectivity, links amplify shocks (Haldane 2009).
Other studies introduce more realistic balance sheets to study how changes in certain
components of balance sheets impact systemic stability. Gai and Kapadia (2010) explore
the effects of changes in network structure and asset market liquidity on the probability
of contagion derived from counterparty risk. They find that indistinguishable shocks to
the network can have vastly different consequences for contagion and identify two phase
transitions between which the probability of contagion peaks. In a study of the trade-off
between individual and systemic decisions, Beale et al. (2011) show that increasing asset
diversity across banks makes the system more stable, because it prevents herding behavior
that maximizes the probability of systemic collapse.
Several studies analyze the trade-offs between risk-sharing gains in interconnected sys-
tems and the costs of increased risk exposure. Allen, Babus, and Carletti (2012) build a
two-period model where the links of the banks are the exchange of their asset portfolio,
and find that a more clustered network structure is more prone to contagion. Cabrales,
Gottardi and Vega-Redondo (2013) analyze the capacity of the different network struc-
tures to absorb shocks in a model where the links come from interbank participation
on other banks’ investment. They find that when shocks follows a fat-tail distribution,
extreme segmentation is optimal because it minimizes contagion; while high density is
optimal for thin tail distributions, because it achieves the highest risk-sharing. Arinami-
nathy, Kapadia, and May (2012) add confidence shocks to their model and conclude that
the impacts of large, well-connected banks scale more than proportionately with their
size. The systemic impact not only depends on the connectivity but also on the level of
confidence. Glasserman and Young (2013) introduce bankruptcy costs into a system with
confidence loss, and find that the former increases the probability of contagion, while the
latter increases its costs. Finally, Elliott, Golub and Jackson (2013) also introduce failure
costs and distinguish between first failure, contagion, and propagation. They show that
the middle region of connection density is the most vulnerable to contagion. They also
find that cascades introduce a moral hazard problem. Firms have an incentive to bail out
a large failed bank in order to avoid failure costs to themselves, which then incentivizes
failing firms to increase these costs in order to be bailed out.
Most of the literature above uses simulations to study contagion in interbank networks,
for two reasons. First, finding analytical solutions on asymmetric network structures with
heterogeneous bank sizes, balance sheets, etc. is mathematically hard. Second, data
available for empirical studies are limited: nodes may not be easily identifiable, or links
may be limited to a particular day, or data sets may omit global exposures, etc.
Despite the data challenges, some studies use empirical data, which are useful for
establishing parameters in simulations. Soramaki et al. (2007) look at the US interbank
payment system and find that the network has both a low average path length and low
connectivity; the degree distribution is scale free over a substantial range; the clustering
coefficient of the network is 90 times greater than the clustering coefficient of a comparable
random network; and the distribution of link weights follows a power law when weighted by
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the volume of payments and a lognormal when weighted by the value of payments. Degryse
and Nguyen (2007) show that Belgium has shifted away from complete networks, which
has reduced the contagion risk in this country. Mistulli (2011), with data from the Italian
banking system, find that only a small fraction of banks can trigger contagion; which is the
classical too-big-to-fail argument. Motivated by the too-big-to-fail debate, Battiston et al.
(2012) look at the debt exposure among institutions and estimate the systemic importance
of a bank using centrality measures. They suggest that the discussion be broadened to
institutions too-central-to-fail to account for the systemic importance of highly connected
nodes. Arinaminpathy et al. (2012) shows that the impact of large well-connected banks
on the systemic stability scales more than proportionately with their size, which is similar
to the findings in biology, where the role played by superspreaders of infectious diseases is
equivalent to the one of large banks in a banking network.
Other studies highlight similarities between networks in finance with networks in ecol-
ogy and epidemiology. In 1972, May showed that species exhibit a sharp transition from
overall stability to instability as the number and strength of interactions increase. Beale et
al. (2011) find that the tension found in the banking sector between the ideal distribution
of assets from an individual stability perspective and from systemic stability perspective
is similar to ecological systems, where natural selection leads them to adapt in a similar
way while protection of the whole system leads them to diversify. While research on the
trade-off between banks’ individually optimal behavior and systemic optimal behavior is
inconclusive, most studies show that it depends on the structure of the network. We take
an additional step towards understanding this trade-off and its implication for financial
systemic risk by showing that not only network parameters but also financial parameters
such as interbank lending rate, opportunity return rate and leverage are important in
assessing contagion risk, with financial parameters being the more important.
1.3 Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model used in this
paper. Section 3 presents the theoretical analysis of the critical degree. Section 4 shows
the results of the simulations; and the paper ends with a discussion of the main findings
in Section 5.
2 A model of interbank lending
We use a model of interbank payment flows similar to one introduced in (Eisenberg and
Noe, 2001), variants of which are commonly used in the recent literature on banking
networks, see e.g. (Gai and Kapadia, 2010) and (Acemoglu et al., 2013). Our formulation,
however, incorporates two new parameters: accounting leverage Λ and interbank exposure
f . As we will see, these allow us to come to grips with the effect of diversification, and in
particular of the mean degree of the network, on failures propagation.
We analyze a system of N risk-neutral financial institutions (“banks”) labelled i ∈
{1 · · · , N} operating in a simple two-period economy. Each bank has generic assets and
liabilities in addition to interbank loans. At t = 0, each bank has an investment opportu-
nity and uses its liabilities to fund the investment. At t = 1, the investment project yields
a return of R; and the interbank debts are repaid with a return of r, where R > r > 1.
4
The senior liabilities do not bear any interest and must also be repayed at t = 1.
In our model, one bank, bank i, receives an exogenous shock on the return on investment
such that Ri = 0. If the total revenues of the shocked bank are less than the debt to be
repaid, the bank defaults. This individual default may create distress on its creditors since
the failed bank may be unable to repay its debt in full. Consequently, other banks may
be affected and a cascade of failures could occur. In this way an individual bank failure
may become a systemic banking failure. We study what factors determine this systemic
failure.
2.1 Balance sheets and financial ratios
The banking network consists of interbank loans, represented as lij , with lij > 0 when
there is a directed link from bank i to bank j in the network and lij = 0 otherwise.
1
Each bank i is initialized with an asset portfolio consisting of these interbank loans,
li =
∑
j 6=i lij , as well as other liquid assets (cash, bonds, etc.) λi and illiquid assets
(buildings, etc.) ιi:
asseti = li + λi + ιi. (1)
Total Assets Total Liabilities
liquid assets λi senior liabilities σi
illiquid assets ιi interbank borrowings bi
interbank loans li capital Ki
Figure 1: Balance sheet of bank i.
We assume that the fractions of each type of asset are constant throughout the network.
These fractions are defined as
f = li/asseti
f (λ) = λi/asseti
f (ι) = ιi/asseti.
The liabilities of each bank i, in turn, consist of interbank borrowings bi =
∑
j 6=i lji and
senior liabilities σi:
liabi = bi + σi. (2)
The senior liabilities consist of debts which take priority for repayment, such as deposits.
We assume that the leverage Λ is fixed, and is defined according to the capital Ki as
Λ ≡ assetsi/Ki (3)
Ki ≡ asseti − liabi, (4)
implying that the senior liabilities σi can be expressed in terms of constants and each




li − bi. (5)




Next, each bank uses the entirety of its liabilities to invest in an external market, obtaining
in return on its investment2




Here Ri is an interest rate, which may be larger than one for a succesful investment or
smaller than one for an unsuccessful investment, or “shock”.
2.3 Repayment equation
Third, after the investments are made and their returns collected, all banks repay first
their senior liabilities σi then their junior (interbank) liabilities with an interest rate r.
Repayments are made using their return on investments ρi, liquid assets λi and incoming
repayments xji, as follows:
• Full repayment : if ρi +λi−σi +
∑
j 6=j xji ≥ rbi, bank i repays its junior debt in full,
hence for each j 6= i
xij = rlji,
• Partial default : if 0 < ρi + λi− σi +
∑
j 6=j xji < rbi, bank i repays only a fraction of








• Complete default : if ρi + λi− σi +
∑
j 6=j xji ≤ 0, bank i repays nothing at all, hence
xij = 0 for each j 6= i.













j 6=i xij , we say that bank i is in partial default when 0 < xi < rbi and in
complete default when xi = 0; when a bank i can just repay its interbank borrowings, i.e.
when





xj = rbi, (8)
we say that i is critical.
After all repayments are made, bank i has a new capital
K ′i = ρi + λi + ιi − σi +
∑
j 6=i
(xji − xij). (9)
We call “safe” the banks i such that K ′i ≥ 0, and “failed” the ones such that K ′i < 0. The
remainder of this manuscript is dedicated to the study of the number F of failed banks
as a function of the financial parameters (interbank exposure f , accounting leverage Λ,
interest rates R and r) and of the network topology. For simplicity we will neglect the
effect of illiquid assets, i.e. we will take ιi = 0 so that f
(λ) = 1− f .
2If σi < 0, we take ρi = (Ri − 1)bi; equivalently, the return is defined by ρi = (Ri − 1) max{liabi, bi}.
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Figure 2: The critical degree (15) as a function of the interbank exposure f and of the
leverage factor Λ, for R = 1.05, r = 1.01 (left) and as function of R and r for f = 70%
and Λ = 20 (right).
3 Critical diversification and expected number of failures
In this section we study the relationship between failures contagion and degree in the
network (aka diversification). Specifically, we provide an explicit formula (in terms of the
financial ratios f and Λ and of the interest rates R and r) for the critical degree k∗, such
that failures extend to non-shocked banks only if k ≤ k∗. To this aim, let us begin by
considering the special case of regular networks.
3.1 Regular networks
A regular network is a network where the in-degrees ~ki and out-degrees ~ki of all banks i
are equal to the same value k. It follows from this assumption that li = bi = k, hence the
repayment equation
xi =














where ηi = (2− Λ)/Λf if i is the shocked bank and ηi = [(R− 1)Λ + (2−R)]/Λf else.
To proceed, we now make the further assumption that all banks at a given distance d
from the shocked bank repay the same amount xd. This allows us to write











{(R− 1)Λ + (2−R)
Λf
k +






where c0 is the local clustering coefficient of the shocked bank.
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The critical degree k∗ is defined by the condition that only the shocked bank defaults,




∗ − 1)rk∗ + (1− c0)(k∗ − 1)rk∗
k∗
= rk∗. (14)
Equations (12) and (14) can be solved for k∗, giving
k∗ =
(
r − [r − (Λ− 2)/(Λf)]+
(R− 1)Λ + (2−R)
)
Λf. (15)
We can distinguish two cases.
• If the shocked bank is in complete default (f < (Λ − 2)/Λr), the critical degree
depends on the interbank interest rate r, reading
k∗ =
rfΛ
(R− 1)Λ + (2−R)
.
• If the shocked bank is only in partial default (f ≥ (Λ − 2)/Λr), the critical degree
depends neither on the interbank interest rate r nor on the loan fraction f , reading
k∗ =
Λ− 2
(R− 1)Λ + (2−R)
.
Observe that, in the limit of large leverage (Λ  1) and large interbank exposure




Thus, in this limit, the critical degree is just the inverse return on investment, and can
therefore take large values, of the order of one hundred. The general dependence of k∗ on
the interbank exposure f and the leverage factor Λ is plotted in Fig. 2.
In a regular network, we therefore predict that F = 1 for k ≥ k∗ (only the shocked
bank fails), F = 1 + k for k < k∗ but k not too small (all first neighbors fail, and no other
bank fails), and F > 1 + k for k very small (all first neighbors and some higher neighbors
fail). This is confirmed in Fig. 3, where the number of failures in regular networks with
N = 20 was computed numerically.
3.2 More general networks
The case of regular networks forms the basis of a mean-field-type approximation of the
expected number of failures 〈F 〉 for more general random networks, including scale-free
ones. This approximation is based on the following assumptions:
• In any directed random network, the average in-degree 〈~ki〉 and the average out-
degree 〈 ~ki〉 are equal to the mean degree k. Here, we shall assume that ~ki = ~ki ≡ ki
for each bank i, even though ki may depend on i.
• On average, each bank i with degree ki reacts to the shock of another bank as if all
banks had degree ki; in particular, the first neighbors of the shocked bank will fail
if ki < k
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Figure 3: Failures in a regular network. Center: number of failures in a regular network
with N = 20 banks (with R = 1.05, r = 1.01, f = .7, Λ = 20) as a function of the degree
k; the vertical line corresponds to the critical degree k∗ obtained in (15). Note the second
maximum at k = 2, corresponding to the extension of failures to second neighbors of the
shocked bank. Sides: sample regular networks with k = 5 (left) and k = 10 (right); the
shocked bank is represented in black, the failing banks in red and the safe banks in green.
Denoting f(k) the cumulative degree distribution (the probability that a given bank has
an in-degree and out-degree ≤ k), z the mean degree and z2 the mean number of second
neighbors, we are thus led to the expression
〈F 〉 ' 1 + kf(k∗) (17)
where k is the mean degree of the network.3 We test the validity of this—admittedly
rough—approximation in the next section.
4 Comparison of different network topologies
4.1 Models of random graphs
In order to assess the impact of the network topology on the number of failures, we
generated various directed and undirected random networks and ran numerical simulations
of the repayment equation.
• Undirected networks.
Undirected networks correspond to the case where, whenever bank i lends money to
bank j, bank j also lends money to bank i. Although unrealistic, this situation is
the simplest one to investigate, both analytically and numerically. Furthermore, it
allows us to use familiar models of random networks, such as the Erdös-Rényi model
(Erdös and Rényi, 1959) and the Barabási-Albert model (Barabási and Albert, 1999).
– Erdös-Rényi networks. Starting from N initially unconnected nodes, each
pair of nodes is connected by an undirected link with probability p. The result-
ing network has a Poissonian degree distribution with mean k = p(N − 1). See
Fig. 4a.
3This formula could in principle be refined as 〈F 〉 ' 1 + k2f(k∗2) + · · · , where k2 is the mean number
of second neighbors and k∗2 the “second critical degree”, corresponding to the defined as the maximum
degree such that failures extend beyond the first neighbors of the shocked bank (see the second maximum
in Fig. 3).
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– Barabási-Albert networks. Given m0 initial nodes, we attach at each time
step a new node to m ≤ m0 existing nodes, according to the rule of prefer-
ential attachment, meaning that a new node is attached to an old one i with
probability ki/
∑
j kj . For sufficiently large N , this yields a power-law degree
distribution with exponent −3. See Fig. 4b.


























Figure 4: Sample undirected networks with N = 50 and k = 4 (left) and the histograms
of their vertex degrees (right).
• Directed networks.
Directed networks correspond to the general case where bank i may lend to bank j
even though bank j does not lend to bank i. While it is easy to modify the Erdös-
Rényi model to incorporate directedness, there is no obvious directed generalization
of the Barabási-Albert model. Scale-free directed networks, however, can easily be
generated using the so-called “static” model (Goh et al., 2001).
– Erdös-Rényi directed networks. Starting from N initially unconnected
nodes, each ordered pair of nodes is connected by an directed link with proba-
bility p. The resulting network has Poissonian in-degree and out-degree distri-
butions with mean k = p(N − 1). See Fig. 5a.
– Goh-Kahng-Kim “static” directed networks. Starting from N initial









−αout , where 0 ≤ αin, αout < 1. Then draw a node i at
random from the distribution pin and a node i
′ at random from the distribution
pout; if i 6= i′, assign a directed link from i to i′; else do nothing. Repeat this
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operation Nk times, dropping multiple edges when they occur. The resulting
network has power-law in-degree and out-degree distributions, with respective
exponents (αin + 1)/αin and (αout + 1)/αout. See Fig. 5b.











(a) Directed Erdös-Rényi network













(b) Directed static scale-free (with αin = αout = .9) network
Figure 5: Sample undirected networks with N = 50 and k = 4 (left) and the histograms
of their vertex degrees (right).
4.2 Distribution of failures: numerical results
For each (undirected and directed) random networks models, we simulated the model
of interbank payment flows of sec. 2 using Mathematica and Matlab, and plotted the
number of failures F as a function of the mean degree k for various values of the financial
parameters R, r, f and Λ. We also developed a graphical tool to visualize the propagation
of failures across the network, which proved very useful in guiding our intuition (see Fig.
6).
Our results, presented in Fig. 7 - 9, can be summarized as follows:
• Existence of a transition. In all cases, we observed a (smooth) transition between
a no-contagion regime for k  k∗ to a contagion regime for k - k∗. At low degree
(k ' 0), the isolation of the shocked bank ensures that failures do not propagate (in
the Erös-Rényi case, k = 1 is the percolation threshold).
• Validity of the mean-field approximation. In spite of its simplicity, we found that our
mean-field approximation is in qualitative agreement with the numerical results for
11
Figure 6: Visualization of failure propagation in various types of networks of N = 50 with
mean (in-)degree k = 4 (from top left to bottom right: Erdös-Rényi, Barabási-Albert,
directed Erdös-Rényi, directed static scale free). The black node indicates the shocked
bank, the red nodes the failed banks, the green nodes the safe banks. Here R = 1.05,
r = 1.01, f = 70% and Λ = 20.
the mean number of failures, see. Fig. 7 and Fig. 8. In the Barabási-Albert case, for-
mula (17) slightly overestimates the mean number of failures in the contagion regime;
in the directed static scale-free case, on the contrary, (17) is an underestimation.
• Large deviations and catastrophic failures. The mean number of failures by itself
gives us little information about the probability of catastrophic cascades—failures
taking out a significant fraction of the network. We found that, while the mean
number of failures is slightly smaller in the scale-free (Barabási-Albert and directed
static) cases, the probability of catastrophic cascades is much larger than in the
Poissonian case (Erdös-Rényi models), see Fig. 9. This is an illustration of the
“robust-yet-fragile” nature of scale-free networks, which can be traced back to the
presence of many low-degree, low-threat banks (robustness) as well as a few high-
degree, high-threat banks (fragility).
All in all, our results illustrate that, in spite of their “complexity” and their “robust-
yet-fragile” character (observed in Fig. 9), the expected behavior of scale-free interbank
networks vis-à-vis financial shocks can be understood analytically through a single function
12
Figure 7: Expected number of failures in undirected Erdös-Rényi (left) and Barabási-
Albert (right) networks with N = 50 banks, for R = 1.05, r = 1.01, f = 70% and Λ = 20.
of the financial parameters, namely k∗(f,Λ, R, r). This finding is the main contribution
of this work.
5 Conclusion
This research attempts to understand the effects of network structure and financial pa-
rameters on the propagation of contagion in financial networks. We explored this problem
using a mean-field type approximation, which allowed us to obtain a closed-form analytical
solution for the degree at which failures begin to propagate in the network. This critical
degree depends on the financial parameters of the model; that is, leverage Λ; interbank
exposure f ; return on the investment opportunity R; and interbank lending rate r. Our
computer simulations tested the robustness of our results on various types of networks.
While failure propagation shows a sharp transition at critical degree for regular networks,
the transition is more gradual for general random networks because of the non-uniformity
of the degree distribution. We provide a rough but qualitatively correct estimate of the
expected number of failures in such more general cases.
It has often been stressed that real-world networks, owing to their scale-free nature,
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Directed static scale-free networks
Figure 8: Expected number of failures in directed Erdös-Rényi (left) and directed static

































Figure 9: Distribution of failures for undirected Erdös-Rényi and Barabási-Albert networks
(left), and directed Erdös-Rényi and directed static scale-free networks (right) of N = 50
banks with mean (in- and out-)degree k = 4, for R = 1.05, r = 1.01, f = 70% and Λ = 20.
nodes and are effectively absorbed, but shocks to high-degree hubs can lead to catastrophic
cascades.) We observed these large fluctuations in our model as well, confirming the strong
connection between degree and failure distributions.
Besides refining our mean-field approximation to put this connection between degree
and failures distribution on stronger mathematical footings, future work could include
various extensions of the model itself. Indeed, while this research considers a simplified
situation where an exogenous shock affects a single bank, one may wish to consider consec-
utive shocks to multiple banks. Further, variability in interest rates may be incorporated
in the model by drawing investment rate R from a probability distribution, capturing the
heterogeneity in the investments of each bank. Other extensions could include the effects
of out-degree on the loan sizes, which appear to take the form of a power law (Soromäki
et al. 2007). Assets classes and multiple time periods could be introduced to make the
study more comprehensive and realistic.
Nonetheless, establishing a critical degree for the spread of financial contagion in a
banking network is significant. Determining and regulating interbank loan networks in real
time is a challenge, due to confidentiality concerns and rapidly evolving loan portfolios. As
critical degree seems to depend on financial variables in a definite way, regulators should
pay particular attention to the monitoring and control of these variables to minimize the
probability of systemic failures in the banking system.
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[35] K. Soramäki, M. L. Bech, J. Arnold, R. J. Glass, and W. E. Beyeler, Physica A:
Statistical Mechanics and its Applications 379, 317 (2007).
[36] S. Vivier-Lirimont, (Working Paper, 2006).
[37] D. J. Watts, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99, 5766 (2002).
16
